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INTRODUCTION
The apartheid city was created as a response to the urban crises of 
the 1940s. In order to protect and enhance the interests of its 
white constituency the National Party government drew on past 
policies of racial segregation and spatial management to re­
structure and entrench more deeply the racial city form. The 
processes of urbanisation were blocked and racial groups 
channelled into clearly defined spatial zones within the city or, in 
the case of illegal entrants, removed from the cities to rural homes 
or resettlement camps in the homelands.
This created a framework for a period of economic expansion and 
political stability in which the racial and class antagonisms built 
into the social structure were held together by a highly repressive 
regime. The apartheid system accelerated class mobility amongst 
whites and to a lesser extent coloured and Indian urban residents 
whilst thwarting similar processes amongst Africans. The 
concentration of socio-economic resources in the white suburbs 
and extrusion of black city dwellers to the badly resourced urban 
periphery had produced a particular racial and class map of the 
city by the early 1970s. However the racial city form became 
increasingly unworkable from the late 1970s due to its economic 
inefficiency, and politically unmanageable as a result of growing 
political mobilisation against apartheid.
The accelerating processes of rapid urbanisation and class 
differentiation from the 1980s frayed the tight fabric of the 
apartheid city and spilled over its constraining boundaries. New 
social and economic forces in urban life emerged as Africans 
began to struggle for access to the core areas of the city, or for 
increased resources to make urban life on the metropolitan 
margins more amenable.This had differential effects on the 
various urban communities. The white suburbs, by and large, 
have maintained their social stability and political power. While 
some black families have been absorbed into the white suburban
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areas, white urban interests, for the most part, have been able to 
displace demands for urban resources away from the centres of 
urban power. This deflection has confined the struggles of the 
excluded majority to the constricting socio-economic boundaries 
of the urban periphery. These marginalised areas, with their 
inadequate resources, have been wholly unable to cater for the 
urban requirements of their populations. The containment of the 
struggles within the marginalised peripheries has build up 
immense political pressure within them, unleashing intermittent 
violent explosions^.
It is becoming increasingly clear that resolution of the conflict 
within the black residential areas cannot be secured without the 
developmental needs of those areas being addressed within peace 
and reconstruction pacts. It is also becoming clear that the 
problems of the black residential areas - the need for housing, 
resources, infrastructure, better communications and other 
resources - cannot be solved by development plans and processes 
which restrict themselves to the black areas alone. What is needed 
is re-examination of the whole city. It is only through a re­
conceptualisation of the apartheid city as a whole that a durable 
and large scale solution can be worked out to deal with conflict in 
the black residential areas.
Out of all the metropolitan areas in South Africa we feel that 
many of the connections between the apartheid city form, violence 
and reconstruction can best be investigated and illustrated in the 
context of the Durban Functional Region (DFR). In its racial 
planning Durban combined the policies both of residential and 
territorial apartheid because of its particular geographical location 
close to the KwaZulu homeland. Furthermore, the disintegration 
of apartheid controls occurred in the DFR well before the other 
metropolitan areas. Durban differs from the other cities in that 
informal urban settlement on a massive scale is a fait accompli 
and the development task is to address the consequences. Other 
cities have the advantage, on the basis of this experience, of being
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able to anticipate and plan for settlement and may thus benefit 
from the store of experience gained in the DFR.
The paper is divided into four sections. Section 1 describes how 
the city came to be structured racially from the 1940s to the 
1980s. Section 2 shows how the nature and spread of the violence 
in the 1980s related to the racial structuring of the city, rapid 
urbanisation, social differentiation and the emergence of localised 
power centres in the black residential areas. Section 3 poses the 
alternatives now facing the city - continuing down the path of 
exclusion and confrontation with the prospect that the violence 
will spread from the black residential peripheries to the white core 
city areas, or peaceful negotiations over a new, more inclusive, 
city form. Finally, section 4 examines alternative conceptions of 
the spatial restructuring of the Durban Functional Region.
APARTHEID SPATIAL PLANNING: 1940s - 
1980s_____________________________________
The growth of Cato Manor, removals and township 
construction: 1940s-1960s
Durban in the 1940s exhibited many of the problems faced by 
the city today, namely, extensive squatting, social upheaval, and 
violence. With the coming to power of the Nationalist Party in 
1948, the concerns of many of the white residents and city 
officials of Durban were to coincide with the aim of the 
Nationalist Government to rid the inner cities of Africans, Indians 
and Coloureds (Davies, 1991; McCarthy, 1988).
Industrial expansion and the relaxation of influx control during, 
and immediately after, World War II led to rapid urbanisation in 
all of South Africa's major cities. African people came to the 
cities to find jobs in the context of rapidly expanding employment 
brought on by war-time demand for industrial products and post-
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war industrial growth (Maylam, 1982). Influx control throughout 
South Africa had been relaxed in the proclaimed urban areas, 
although residential controls still prevented Africans from moving 
into the city itself, except under strict supervision within the 
hostels or in domestic quarters in white suburbs (Hindson, 1987).
Most African migrants who came to Durban ended up settling in 
Cato Manor, a large squatter area initially outside the municipal 
boundaries of the city (see map 1). Here they could find relatively 
cheap accommodation as tenants or sub-tenants on Indian owned 
land or on vacant ground. Cato Manor provided an accessible and 
relatively cheap base for Africans close to employment in the city, 
and grew rapidly from a population of 2 500 in 1936 to reach a 
peak of approximately 120 000 by 1958 (Townsend, 1991; and 
Davies, 1991).
The area was feared by white residents of Durban as a centre of 
illicit liquor brewing and consumption, vice, disease and violence. 
The concentration of large numbers of impoverished blacks in 
close proximity to the suburbs, as well as Afro/Asian conflict and 
clashes between squatters and the police and military, aroused 
white fears about personal safety, crime, health, and economic 
competition (Maylam, 1982). The concerns of whites fed into 
nationalist government thinking on urban segregation and 
bantustan policy (Maharaj, 1992; McCarthy, 1988).
Through the various Urban Areas and Group Areas acts the 
National Party government intensified influx control, embarked on 
mass forced removals, enforced stricter residential controls on 
blacks, and subsequently enforced residential segregation. 
Although for a brief period the possibility of Cato Manor being 
developed as an African residential area was mooted (Nuttall, 
1989), the introduction of Group Areas legislation in Durban in 
1958 (Davies, 1991) together with the concerns of city officials 
regarding the health and safety of white residents, ultimately 
resulted in the removal of Africans and Indians from Cato Manor.
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By the mid 1960s virtually all squatters had been removed and this 
left a large tract of open land to the west of Durban. Only a 
handful of Indian families were able to cling to their homes and 
remain in the area through the coming decades.
Massive housing programmes were initiated to the south and north 
of Durban to house those removed from Cato Manor and other 
inner city areas. Africans were resettled in KwaMashu and, to a 
lesser extent, Umlazi, while Indians were mainly sent to 
Chatsworth (see map 2). The state provided low cost housing and 
these areas absorbed large numbers of African and Indian 
families. In contradistinction to the grievances felt by the richer 
landowning Indian sector of Cato Manor, many of the poorer 
Indian tenants responded with mixed emotions; they received their 
first homes, but as a consequence of forced removal. Only the 
smaller African townships of Lamontville and Chesterville, which 
were under municipal control, and a few middle income Indian 
areas such as Overport and Clare Estate were to escape 
banishment to the city's far periphery.
By the end of the 1960s the state-funded housing programme in 
most African areas had essentially drawn to a close. Many 
Africans who had lived in Cato Manor, however, were unable to 
acquire housing in the new townships, due to illegality, an 
inability to pay rents and other reasons. It is estimated that some 
30 000 Africans 'disappeared' during the removals (Maasdorp and 
Humphries, 1975). Many of these people took advantage of 
African and/or Indian freehold land in areas like Inanda and 
Clermont, where they rented rooms from landlords or erected 
their own dwellings. Others sought the permission of chiefs and 
indunas in areas abutting the townships.
The removals from Cato Manor and other parts of the city 
entrenched the racial city form. Whites retained the core city 
areas, Indians were largely rehoused in Chatsworth which lay 
between the white and African residential areas in the south of
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Durban, and Africans were relegated to dormitory suburbs on the 
far peripheries of the city - KwaMashu in the north and Umlazi in 
the south.
Underlying this racial structure was also a class and income 
structure. Whites, in the core city areas, comprised a protected 
skilled working class, middle income professional and managerial 
classes. Over the 1960s the Indian population in the inner 
periphery (Chatsworth) occupied an intermediate income group, 
comprising mainly semi-skilled and skilled workers and lower 
middle income semi-professionals. Africans, on the outer 
peripheries (KwaMashu and Umlazi) were at the bottom of the 
income structure, and comprised mainly the unskilled, semi­
skilled and unemployed workers (Hindson and Crankshaw, 1993). 
The spatial and income profile of the city was thus the reverse of 
many western cities with their decaying centres and affluent 
suburban peripheries.
Township construction and the re-emergence of 
squatting: 1960s-1980s
The short term viability of urban apartheid was based on the 
exclusion of Indians and Africans from the centres of economic 
and political power in the cities, the minimisation of social and 
infrastructural expenditure in the new townships, low wages, and 
the creation of a differentiated workforce, with some urban 
Africans having minimal access to urban residential rights whilst 
the majority were prohibited from permanently settling in the 
urban areas.
Although extremely repressive, urban apartheid was a highly 
effective system in the short term, both as a mechanism of urban 
political control and, for a time, in securing an economically 
subservient workforce. The 1960s was a decade of political 
stability and rapid economic expansion. However, during the 
1970s the underlying contradictions, costs and inefficiencies of the
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This coincides with the beginning of a new stage of urbanisation 
and apartheid spatial planning. The 1970s saw the state grant 
greater powers to the bantustans either in the form of 
independence or of self government. This impacted on the process 
of urbanisation in a number of important ways. In the country as a 
whole, a form of deconcentrated urban settlement occurred on the 
fringes of the bantustans abutting the metropolitan areas through 
the settlement of large numbers of workers, who commuted daily 
to work, in the core city areas. Deconcentrated urbanisation 
extended urban sprawl, reinforced the racial geography of the 
city, and added to the high costs of infrastructural expenditure and 
services in black residential areas.
The proximity of KwaZulu to Durban made it possible for the 
state to achieve the objectives of residential and territorial 
apartheid simultaneously in this city. With the granting of self- 
governing status to KwaZulu the vast majority of Durban's 
African people were converted into cross-border commuters. The 
exceptions were people living in the long-established townships of 
Chesterville, Lamontville and Clermont, which had been 
established initially as labour supply outposts beyond the 
municipal boundaries of Durban and Pinetown, and were difficult 
to move due to the costs involved and the threat of resistance.
The most obvious signs of the failure of territorial apartheid 
appeared in the early 1970s. By this time most new housing 
development in the townships had ceased^, and pressure on 
existing housing stock increased through natural population 
growth as well as illegal immigration into the formal townships^. 
During the 1970s township people, particularly the young who 
were unable to obtain houses, began moving out of the townships 
onto adjacent land where they joined migrants from the rural areas 
to form squatter camps (see map 3).4 The hilly terrain and 
subtropical vegetation of Durban, as well as the reluctance of
system  began to appear.
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tribal authorities to apply influx control in their areas, enabled 
squatting to go unnoticed by officialdom and the white public for a 
time. It took the form of slow, and sometimes clandestine, 
densification within the freehold and tribal areas as well as on 
mission and state land near the peripheral black townships, and 
thus, at first, posed only a remote threat to white residential 
concerns.
The proximity of tribal and freehold land to the African townships 
of Durban meant that influx control was far more difficult to 
apply than in many other metropolitan areas of South Africa. For 
the Port Natal Bantu Affairs Administration Board the problems 
of maintaining influx and residential controls increased when 
KwaZulu gained self-governing status in 1974 (Mare and 
Hamilton, 1987), because the tribal authorities had neither the 
means nor the incentives to enforce
a system of control devised and administered by the Department 
of Bantu Administration and Development in the 1960s (Hindson, 
1987). The tribal labour bureaux, designed as a system of efflux 
control in the late 1960s, had always been ineffective, and were 
entirely unsuited to the exercise of influx control in rapidly 
urbanising tribal areas on the metropolitan peripheries.
Rapid urbanisation and residential differentiation: the 
1980s and early 1990s
By contrast to the 1970s when squatting was semi-clandestine and 
relatively slow, the 1980s witnessed the mushrooming of open 
squatting, at times involving land invasions, in and around the 
black townships on the metropolitan periphery. Estimates of the 
size and growth of the African population in the DFR are 
notoriously unreliable. The official statistics on urbanisation in the 
DFR are not reliable, and it is necessary to turn to estimates based 
on the work of local researchers. The best available source on the 
numbers of Africans living in formal and informal housing is that
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given by May and Stavrou for the period 1980 to 1987 (Appendix 
1). According to their calculations, between 1980 and 1985 the 
total African population increased at an annual average rate of 5.9 
percent, while the numbers in informal housing grew at 9 percent 
per annum. Between 1985 and 1987 the total African population 
grew at 11.1 percent and the informal at 19.7 percent per annum. 
By 1987 the informally housed African population comprised 50 
percent of the total African population, having increased from an 
estimated 37 percent in 1980.
Added to the steady weakening of influx controls that had been 
going on since the early 1970s, a number of factors came together 
to open the flood gates. Severe drought in the late 1970s drove 
large numbers of people out of neighbouring rural areas towards 
the cities in search of work. From the early 1980s a series of 
confrontations occurred between youth and residents' 
organisations on the one hand, and township authorities on the 
other, which led to a weakening of township administration and 
hence the capacity to control settlement.
The immediate precipitating factor was the attempt by the 
authorities to devolve housing and influx control powers to 
unpopular black local authorities, while at the same time 
increasing rents and public transport fares. This abortive 
application of the recommendations of the Riekert Commission 
(Riekert Commission, 1979) sparked off major rent and bus 
boycotts in the early 1980s; actions that marked the beginning of 
extensive and prolonged political violence in the DFR (Byerley, 
1989; Reintges, 1986; Torr 1985).
The ensuing weakening, and in some cases collapse, of black local 
authorities meant that control could no longer be exercised over 
land and housing allocation and hence the pace and form of 
urbanisation. Open land occupations and invasions replaced 
clandestine squatting, first on vacant land near the townships and 
then, in the late 1980s, within the townships themselves
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(Townsend, 1991). At a national level, these developments were 
recognised and given further impetus by the formal abolition of 
influx control in 1986. A further stage of squatting began in the 
late 1980s as squatter settlements sprang up in inner city areas 
such as Kennedy Road, Clare Estate and, most notably, within 
Cato Manor itself. 5 The common thread in these developments 
was the growing incapacity of local authorities to exercise controls 
over African squatting in the face of a mounting challenge to their 
legitimacy, both through struggles mounted in the Durban area 
over squatter settlement and the continued application of the 
Group Areas Act, and at the national level through the growing 
opposition to white rule, and a state reform strategy which 
coupled modifications of apartheid with liberal reforms.
A second major social development in the 1980s was the growth 
of middle income suburbs in the black residential areas on the 
periphery. Whereas classic apartheid attempted to suppress class 
divisions within the African population, the urban reform strategy 
pursued by the government in the 1980s sought to foster class 
divisions within urban black residential areas (Morris and 
Hindson, 1992). In the past the primary line of social demarcation 
within the black urban areas was between temporary migrants in 
the hostels and permanent residents in formal township houses 
(Hindson, 1987). During the 1980s, however, two new residential 
groupings emerged. The established townships were flanked on 
the one hand by new housing schemes for lower middle income 
semi-professional and better off working class families, and on the 
other hand by mushrooming squatter settlements dominated by 
unskilled, marginal and unemployed people.
To illustrate this, a survey of social differentiation in three 
adjacent residential areas on the southern side of Umlazi, 
undertaken by the authors in 1992 and 1993, suggests that a 
process of sifting out of income groups has been taking place in 
the black residential areas. The established townships lost some 
middle income individuals and families to the new housing
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estates, and many of the youth, poor and destitute to the 
neighbouring squatter areas. Mean monthly household income in 
Emafezini, a new housing estate which comprises mainly semi­
professionals and better paid working class families, was R2371. 
This compares with an average household income of R1697 in U 
Section of Umlazi, part of an established township with a 
majority of unskilled and semi-skilled workers. The mean 
household income of Malukazi, a neighbouring squatter area, 
made up mainly of the unskilled and unemployed, was only R486. 
When compared to other black residential areas, the average 
household income of townships and middle income housing areas 
is similar, but the figure for Malukazi is very low. This is due to 
the extremely impoverished nature of this particular area, partly 
because of protracted violence6.
The effects of these developments was to produce a three way 
class residential division within the black areas of the DFR, 
comprising an emerging middle income group with the means to 
move to the newly constructed private housing estates; the 
established working class in the old townships under pressure to 
move up or down the social ladder; and the new poor crowded 
into impoverished shack areas in and around the old townships. It 
should be noted that not all the residents of squatter areas are 
equally impoverished. The limited provision of African housing 
from the early 1970s meant that many employed township 
residents moved into shack areas in order to escape overcrowding 
in township houses, and that a section of these people were 
employed and earned relatively high incomes.
The appearance of huge squatter areas on the periphery of the 
Durban metropolitan area marked a clear break with territorial 
apartheid, but it also had the effect of powerfully reinforcing 
residential apartheid and hence the racial geography of the city. 
Although the reform strategy of the 1980s accepted the 
permanence of Africans in the city and, from the mid 1980s, the 
reality and desirability of African urbanisation, the continued
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application of residential controls under the Group Areas Act as 
well as private property rights ensured that impoverished blacks 
were confined to the urban peripheries.
The growth in numbers of people in confined spaces on the black 
urban peripheries greatly increased the scarcity of residential 
resources such as land, housing and services and thus heightened 
competition for these resources. Untrammelled competition for 
basic resources in the context of the collapse of local government, 
the reduction of state assistance for housing and transport, and a 
shrinking resource base for residential life created ideal conditions 
for communal mobilisation around access to, and control over, 
these resources. The mobilisation of residential communities to 
defend or extend control over land and other basic resources was 
a major factor that fed into political mobilisation and conflict in 
the DFR especially from the mid 1980s.
VIOLENCE AND THE BREAKUP OF 
APARTHEID
Prior to the 1980s political violence exhibited two main 
characteristics: it tended to be perpetrated by the state against 
individuals falling foul of the myriad of urban apartheid 
regulations; and it took the form of criminalising such 
transgressions (Hindson, 1987).
Violence in the 1980s emerged in the context of the crumbling of 
territorial apartheid, rapid unplanned urbanisation, the bankruptcy 
of township administration, and abortive attempts to introduce 
economic liberalisation within the framework of residential 
apartheid.
The inherited racial city structure, coupled with the disintegration 
of the apartheid controls on the periphery, displaced and confined 
urban conflict to the margins of the metropolitan area. A battle by
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blacks against exclusion from the political and economic power 
centres of the city - a struggle for greater access to, and control 
over, the resources of the wider society and economy - was 
deflected and turned into a fight over the shrinking resources 
allocated to blacks on the urban perimeters (Morris and Hindson, 
1992).
Both the content and method of implementation of the reforms 
introduced from the late 1970s tended to intensify rather than to 
reduce social dislocation and the potential for conflict. Piecemeal 
liberalisation opened opportunities for some and gave vent to 
aspirations long suppressed under apartheid, but this occurred in a 
context in which not all the major sources of grievance were being 
dealt with. Economic and political concessions were yielded to the 
new middle strata of the black population, including a relatively 
privileged working class, while excluding or marginalising the 
impoverished and dispossessed. The majority of blacks, even 
those who benefitted from reform, continued to feel the effects of 
remaining racial controls, of an increasingly harsh economic 
environment and of exclusion from national political processes.
During the 1980s the economic costs of residential and territorial 
apartheid escalated; social divisions sharpened in the black 
residential areas and were less amenable to simple repressive and 
undifferentiated mechanisms of control; economic and political 
repression was increasingly and openly challenged; and 
competition for access to the urban resources necessary for social 
and economic life intensified.
The apartheid institutions which previously managed conflict 
through control over the black residential areas began to 
disintegrate and increasingly lost their effectiveness. This made 
space for a political struggle for hegemony within the black 
residential areas; a struggle that was integrally tied up with the 
capacity of competing and conflicting parties to capture, control, 
and distribute resources within these areas. The struggle for
FROM VIOLENCE TO RECONSTRUCTION 17
hegemony was greatly intensified with the rise of Inkatha-linked 
warlords and ANC-linked civic and youth organisations (Morris 
and Hindson, 1992; Morris, 1992).
Violence in the early 1980s
Since 1980, township violence in the Durban area has moved 
through three overlapping stages (Byerley, 1992a). In the first 
stage, the early 1980s, it was concentrated in the core area 
townships, notably Chesterville and Lamontville, and 
predominantly took the form of a confrontation between residents 
on the one hand and community councillors, township 
administration, police and army on the other. This may be termed 
'state-people' violence.
In the early 1980s conflict centred mainly on Chesterville and 
Lamontville, two townships within the core city area that had 
always been outside the control of KwaZulu. The tension focused 
around education, transport, rent and labour. It was also 
exacerbated by the threatened incorporation of the Port Natal 
Administration Board controlled townships - Lamontville, 
Chesterville, Clermont and others - into KwaZulu (Byerley,
1989). Residents from these areas joined together to form the 
Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC) which spearheaded the 
campaign against rent increases and later against incorporation 
into KwaZulu (Reintges, 1986; Torr 1985).
The formation of JORAC and the subsequent repression levelled 
against it marks the beginning of a long period of instability and 
violence in black residential areas, but the specific form of this 
first stage of violence was significantly different to later 
developments. In 1983 Chesterville and Lamontville became 
virtual war zones following the assassination of JORAC founder 
member and former town councillor Harrison Dube (Reintges, 
1986; Byerley 1989; Mshengu, 1992). In reaction youth took to 
the streets; councillors' homes were targeted for attack;
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administration buildings, cars, buses and police vehicles were 
stoned and burnt; and sporadic street battles were fought between 
the youth and the police (Byerley, 1980; 1992). A virtual siege of 
Lamontville resulted with the setting up of permanent police road 
blocks at entrances to the township.
The attempt by the KwaZulu authorities to follow through the 
logic of the 1970s stress on territorial apartheid and incorporate 
the core city townships into KwaZulu greatly fuelled the conflict. 
Ignoring the build up of pressure for the dismantling of urban 
apartheid and the acceptance of the permanence of Africans in the 
urban areas, the KwaZulu authorities, in collaboration with the 
central state, sought to incorporate all the Port Natal 
Administration Board townships (Lamontville, Chesterville and 
Clermont) into KwaZulu.
This provoked deep antagonism from these communities.
Violence continued sporadically throughout 1983 and most of 
1984 but began to take on a new focus. Clashes between United 
Democratic Front (UDF) supporting youth and Inkatha supporters 
became common, and unionised workers began to be drawn into 
the conflict. At its inauguration in Lte 1985, the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU) openly declared its 
hostility towards Inkatha, thereby fanning the flames of 
confrontation. Inkatha supporters reacted towards township youth 
linked to the UDF and against COSATU affiliated workers.
The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and Inkatha came 
increasingly to be seen as the puppets of the apartheid state. At 
this time the South African Police began to move away from the 
front lines of the conflict to give way to the KwaZulu Police, a 
force recently set up under the control of the KwaZulu Legislative 
Assembly.
The result of these developments was that the UDF and COSATU 
lined up against Inkatha, the United Workers Union of South 
Africa (UWUSA), and the KwaZulu and South African Police
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(SAP), with a consequent escalation of violence.
Violence from the mid 1980s
In the second stage, from the mid 1980s, the violence shifted 
towards the urban periphery and became increasingly internecine.
The number of people who died from violence in the Durban 
Functional Region between 1986 and 1992 has been estimated as 
3228 (See Appendix 2). The proportion of deaths due to violence 
in the core urban areas (Durban Central) remained low compared 
to the periphery, 9 percent of total deaths in 1986 and 5 percent in 
1992. Within the peripheries the locus of violence shifted from the 
formal townships to the squatter shanty towns, increasing from 30 
percent in 1985 to 70 percent in 1992.
Violence occurred within the black residential areas along 
different lines in different places - squatter communities against 
other squatter communities, township-squatter conflict, hostel- 
township and hostel-squatter conflicts, and finally, cases of intra­
township conflict.
In the established townships on the metropolitan periphery, such 
as KwaMashu and Umlazi, black opposition, which began as an 
organised resistance to bus fare and rent increases in the early 
1980s, was increasingly propelled into political and internecine 
violence.
The murder of the civil rights lawyer Victoria Mxenge in 1985 
marked the beginning of the second stage. Reports of street battles 
between Inkatha and UDF supporters, and between police and 
community abound (Sitas, 1986; Hughes, 1987; Byerley, 1989; 
Gwala 1985). The government's response was to extend to Natal 
the State of Emergency then in force in most of the country. The 
draconian measures employed under the emergency resulted in the 
virtual removal (through detention, death, or going into hiding) of
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The removal of leadership promoted the spread of lawlessness 
within the townships and shantytowns, and the youth constituency 
came to the fore in the ensuing conflict. Clashes between UDF 
supporting youth and Inkatha supporters increased. Black 
councillors and policemen were regularly attacked because they 
were seen to be instruments of the apartheid state.
This period of violence saw UDF supporting youth, joined at 
times by criminal elements, coming to dominance in most of the 
formal townships. The result was that Inkatha leaders and their 
supporters were expelled from large parts of the townships. They 
were, however, to re-emerge in the squatter settlements on the 
margins of the townships, where they teamed up with local 
'shack-cum-warlords' who had effective control over the 
shantytowns.
From the mid 1980s onwards the violence shifted geographically 
to the squatter periphery and became increasingly introverted. 
Political mobilisation and conflict frequently coincided with the 
division between squatters and township dwellers. The UDF, and 
later the ANC, developed their bases largely in the established 
townships, especially amongst the youth, while Inkatha retreated 
into the squatter areas where its political fortunes were tied to the 
warlords.
Prior to the mid 1980s there tended to be relative harmony 
between township people and squatters. There was a sharing of 
resources, such as taps, schools, and other facilities. But, with the 
growing resistance to the state and local councillors, and with the 
expulsion of many Inkatha supporters from the formal townships, 
and of ANC youth from some squatter areas, urban turbulence 
shifted its focus. It turned from a state-people violence into a 
conflict that was essentially and increasingly inter-communal.
the U D F  leadership from the townships.
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One important line of division was between townships and the 
new squatter areas as, for example, between Ntuzuma and 
Lindelani near Inanda. However, conflict was also intense within 
townships and squatter areas and at times between different ethnic 
groups, notably between Zulus and Pondos in Malukazi and 
Number 5 near Umlazi (Byerley, 1989; 1992b). A further feature 
was the superimposition of political allegiance over social and 
material differences.
Squatters were mobilised by warlords to fight for access to 
resources in neighbouring townships, and township youth 
organised military style units to defend their areas and counter 
attack squatter areas. Local power struggles developed over land, 
housing, services and business rights. One of the principal reasons 
why the violence has been so deep rooted is that political 
allegiance to Inkatha and the UDF/ANC tended at this time to 
coincide with residential location and differential access to urban 
resources.
In this period the South African security forces sought to remove 
themselves from the direct line of fire and present themselves as 
playing a more impartial policing role. From 1987, with the 
establishment of the KwaZulu police force, the South African 
Police could move a step back from immediate involvement in the 
violence with KwaZulu. However, they continued to support 
Inkatha in hidden ways including clandestine funding, training of 
hit squads, and direct covert operations against the UDF/ANC 
and their supporters. As the violence shifted to the urban 
peripheries and hence deeper into KwaZulu, so the KwaZulu 
Police came more to the fore as an extension of Inkatha.
From the mid 1980s Inkatha was gradually squeezed out of the 
formal townships. It regrouped and reorganised itself mainly 
amongst the marginalised squatters on the urban periphery. This 
resulted in numerous protracted and bitter conflicts between 
township people and squatters.
22 FROM VIOLENCE TO RECONSTRUCTION
In areas under ANC control attempts to discipline the 'criminal 
elements' in the youth structures led in some cases to splits in the 
youth camp into comrades and comtsotis (gangsters), and in others 
to some youth re-joining Inkatha. From the late 1980s further 
ground was gained by ANC supporters. Large sections of the 
squatter periphery of Durban were 'won' by ANC-aligned 
comrades, and Inkatha retreated into fortress-like pockets of 
ground such as Lindelani and Mshayazafa in Inanda, and also into 
parts of Malukazi near Umlazi.
Although areas came to be defined as 'ANC' or 'IFP' the reality 
of political allegiance is more complex. In many instances 
residents feel compelled to show allegiance to the group that is 
dominant at any particular point in time.
Violence in the early 1990s
In the third stage (1990s) mass confrontations gave way to more 
atomised, targeted and clandestine killing, although internecine 
clashes continued. In this latter stage, two other processes 
increasingly manifested themselves: a drift into criminality and 
internecine violence within black residential areas between 
opposing factions of the same political organisation.
Although it is inherently difficult to be sure of the extent to which 
the killings in the early 1990s are co-ordinated by a political 'third 
force', our own study of violence in the Durban Functional 
Region suggests that there is a range of individuals and groupings 
involved in the violence spanning the political spectrum from 
extreme left to right, rather than a single 'third force'.
These clandestine forces include elements amongst the disaffected 
black youth; some returning Mkonto we Sizwe (MK) cadres who 
find themselves without jobs or other means of support; some of 
those previously employed within the covert repressive structures
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of the state; elements in the security forces who continue with 
covert operations, either within or outside of state structures; 
Inkatha hitmen; elements of the KZP; alienated whites seeking a 
home amongst the far right political parties; and other extremist 
whites who feel they have been 'sold out' by recent moves 
towards political liberalisation.
THE CHALLENGE TO THE RACIAL CITY
We have seen that internecine conflict in the second half of the 
1980s can be explained in part in terms of the racial structuring of 
the city and the capacity of the white urban constituencies and the 
state to displace conflict and its consequences on to the black 
residential areas.
The ability of the state to continue in this role began to weaken by 
the end of the 1980s. Violence became increasingly widespread 
and in some areas endemic. The economic costs of violence in 
terms of life and property destroyed, mounting security costs and 
costs to the economy through disruption of production, 
absenteeism and worker debilitation continued to increase while 
the incentive to invest by local and international finance declined.
The state was confronted with widening opposition from within 
key sectors of white South Africa such as business, as well as an 
increasingly effective international campaign of economic, 
cultural and other forms of isolation.
While the extra-parliamentary movement was significantly curbed 
by the State of Emergency, neither the UDF nor COSATU - the 
two organisations that led open internal opposition during this 
period - were ever fully silenced, and both continued to place 
pressure on the state through various forms of protest and other 
action.
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Within South African cities it became increasingly difficult to 
contain the violence physically, and although white residential 
areas continued to escape the direct effects of township conflict, 
robbery and violence became much more frequent and difficult to 
prevent in the inner city and white suburban areas.
Opposition to the maintenance of racial residential segregation 
also came from two very different groups seeking to escape the 
violence on the urban peripheries and to take up opportunities in 
the core city areas. The late 1980s witnessed the first flow of 
squatters from periphery to core as pockets of squatters occupied 
land, in some instances in areas left vacant by apartheid removals. 
In the climate of growing political instability local authorities 
became increasingly reluctant to remove these groups, despite the 
continued existence of apartheid and anti-squatter laws.
The second major pressure for racial integration of core city areas 
was from middle and upper income black groups seeking housing 
near to places of work and in the more secure white suburban or 
inner city flatland areas. Well before the abandonment of the 
Group Areas Act in 1992 incremental deracialisation, known as 
'greying', had begun to take place, especially in flatland areas and 
in a number of lower income white suburbs near the inner city.
By the end of the 1980s, the white state and those interests 
historically represented by it had to face the stark choice of 
attempting to maintain racial controls under the Group Areas Act 
against mounting opposition from within and outside South 
Africa, or attempting to negotiate a process of deracialisation and 
spatial integration of the city.
Following the unbanning of political organisations and the 
growing acceptance of negotiation as a route to transformation, 
negotiation forums have been established both nationally and 
within several cities and towns, and it is within these that the 
possibility of a peaceful negotiated reconstruction of the cities is
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now being debated.
PEACE AND RECONSTRUCTION IN THE 
DURBAN FUNCTIONAL REGION
This paper has argued that the roots of violence lie in deep 
structural divisions and antagonisms produced by racial policy, 
spatial fragmentation, and the confinement of the poor to the 
metropolitan peripheries.
It follows that lasting peace of a kind that does not rely on further 
state repression will require a fundamental racial, spatial, and 
economic integration of the city. This cannot be achieved without 
threatening interests that are vested in the present spatial 
geography of the city. It is thus critical that a process is 
established whereby reconstruction is undertaken with the 
involvement of all the major interests which can contribute 
constructively to the reconstruction of the city, or which can 
derail that process.
This final section examines a number of approaches to the 
reconstruction of the DFR, and argues for the establishment of a 
metropolitan wide negotiation and development process to 
reconstruct and develop the DFR. It identifies some of the basic 
principles that are being put forward to guide the process of urban 
reconstruction, and argues that care needs to be taken to ensure 
that the process of deracialisation of the city does not take a form 
in which racial discrimination is replaced by an equally conflictual 
spatial and social division. Until recently there have been three 
major approaches to reconstruction and development within the 
DFR: continuing interventions within the framework of the 
official neo-apartheid policy of deconcentration; peace and 
reconstruction pacts in violence torn communities; and core city 
initiatives. We examine each of these in turn.
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Urban deconcentration
From the mid 1980s the central state officially abandoned influx 
controls in the urban areas, but it replaced them with the policy of 
residential and industrial deconcentration and a battery of controls 
such as the anti-squatter laws to back the new policy. African 
urbanisation was accepted, but would take place in newly laid out 
sites on the urban peripheries to which Africans would be 
channelled from squatter areas and overcrowded townships 
(President's Council, 1985).
This strategy met with growing resistance. Squatters have proved 
unwilling to be moved from their areas, and the state has found it 
difficult to access new residential land for the poor. Where land 
has been set aside for site and service development, for example 
to the west of Kingsburgh and Umhlanga, conservative white local 
authorities and residents have joined black community leaders in 
resisting plans for low cost residential development, obviously for 
very different reasons.
A further difficulty with many state funded and private housing 
development projects in the 1980s is that they met with fierce 
resistance from communities not consulted in the planning or 
implementation stages. Where attempts were made to introduce 
development in violence tom communities or in areas with latent 
inter-communal divisions, official projects often provoked or 
accentuated conflict. In many areas around the periphery of 
Durban new formal residential development has all but come to a 
standstill in the early 1990s.
The obvious criticism of the deconcentration policy is that it 
further accentuates the spatial character of the city, namely city 
sprawl, fragmentation and the restriction of the poor to the 
periphery. However, urban expansion will inevitably push the city 
boundaries further out into the peripheries, and sites which may at 
present be unsuitable for development, may become viable as city
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spread proceeds over the longer term.
Investment in violence torn communities
The second approach to urban reconstruction and development 
emerged within violence tom communities on the black residential 
peripheries. It was found in these areas that, to put an end to 
violence, it was first necessary to tackle the problem of political 
rivalry and security force partiality; i.e. to achieve agreement 
over the rules of political contestation and security force conduct. 
Only once this step has been taken does it become possible to 
tackle the underlying problems of social division, poverty, the 
lack of adequate housing, unemployment and other basic social 
and economic problems in the area.
An entire approach beginning with mediation, the formation of 
social compacts around development projects and the project cycle 
has emerged from the experience of violence tom communities 
and has been set out in a number of reports and papers (Byerley 
and Hindson, 1992; Appleton, Hindson and Swilling, 1993; 
Hindson and Byerley, 1993).
Inevitably the focus in any local area will be on the development 
needs of that area and this may be to the neglect of social, spatial 
and economic consideration in the city as a whole. Business, 
union, youth, civic and political organisations involved in peace 
and reconstruction pacts have tended to be highly localised, at 
least until the formation of the National Peace Accord in 1992.
The focus of investment activities in violence tom areas may have 
a powerful symbolic appeal, but may not correspond with the 
wider interests of urban reconstruction. It may, for example, re­
enforce the racial structure of the city and may not make the best 
use of opportunities for spatial and economic integration. In 
addition, many violence tom communities are poorly located with 
respect to transport routes and access to employment, and other
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urban opportunities dealing with these issues require a more 
integrated approach than that allowed for in local peace and 
reconstruction agreements.
It is thus essential to examine the needs of local communities 
within the context of city-wide or metropolitan reconstruction, 
and, while supporting and encouraging local initiative, to ensure 
that local projects are compatible with negotiated reconstruction 
and development at the metropolitan or city level.
Core city development
A third major thrust has been in the area of core city development 
initiatives and projects. Many of these were initiated under the 
umbrella of Operation Jumpstart, an embryonic alliance of 
business, local government and inner city civic interests formed in 
the late 1980s.
Operation Jumpstart achieved a degree of consensus on two basic 
ideas: that the city should be opened to all races, and that vacant 
inner city spaces such as Cato Manor should be developed for 
residential and commercial purposes on a mixed race, mixed 
income basis. Operation Jumpstart was also concerned with a 
number of major inner city commercial projects including the 
proposed Point Road and Esplanade developments.
A major focus of debate since the early 1990s has been on the 
redevelopment of Cato Manor. The Cato Manor Development 
Forum, a body with wide representation from metropolitan and 
Natal regional interests, has achieved consensus on basic 
principles and a broad plan for the redevelopment of the whole 
area.
These core city initiatives have had a powerful symbolic effect 
and, if sustained, will undoubtedly impact heavily on the future 
economic, social and political development of the core city area.
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However, an important weakness is that they have not had strong 
representation from communities on the metropolitan peripheries. 
A danger in present core city initiatives is that they may ultimately 
leave out of account the problems and needs of the vast majority 
of people on the metropolitan peripheries.
This could lead to the restructuring of the city into two socially 
and spatially polarised parts: a multi-racial and relatively affluent 
core city and a black, impoverished periphery.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the DFR is at the cross roads. There is immense 
potential for revitalisation of the city economically and for social 
and political re- integration. But there is also the very real danger 
that competition and conflict over the city and its future could 
degenerate further into confrontation, not only on the periphery 
but within the core city areas themselves.
To avoid these dangers it is necessary to ensure that the 
reconstruction and development process goes beyond localised 
investment projects in violence tom areas and spans more than 
just the relatively affluent core city business, civic and local 
government interests. What is needed is a process of negotiation 
which involves all sections of the metropolitan communities, from 
the CBD to the far peripheries, around a set of principles and, 
ultimately, a set of plans for the reconstruction of the DFR.
For these negotiations to be meaningful it is necessary to ensure 
that marginalised communities, in particular, have the capacity to 
participate effectively. Thus effort and resources will need to be 
deployed into the organisation and capacity building process, 
particularly in the black residential areas.
There is already considerable agreement, both in Durban and in
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other South African cities, around basic principles of urban 
reconstruction and development. These include the need to fix the 
urban edge, increase densities and promote compactness within 
the present city boundaries, increase the access especially of the 
poor to employment opportunities and urban resources through 
increased and redesigned public transport systems, promote mixed 
land use and the integration of residential and commercial areas, 
and upgrade and improve services within black residential 
townships and squatter areas. Despite this growing consensus 
around broad principles, there is considerable room for debate, 
disagreement and conflict over concrete proposals for their 
implementation.
Essentially what is at stake is the basic path of change envisaged 
for the Durban Functional Region. With the collapse of apartheid 
controls and institutions of neo-liberal reforms in the 1980s the 
city has already moved far down the road towards a new form of 
social inclusion and exclusion. The barriers between middle 
income whites, Indians and coloureds have quite rapidly fallen 
away and considerable integration at an economic and social level 
has taken place. More recently this has been followed by the 
dropping of the Group Areas Act and growing residential 
deracialisation amongst these groups.
However, this process of racial integration within the core city 
areas has gone ahead in a context where the vast majority of 
Africans of all income groups and social classes remain trapped in 
the peripheries in shanty towns, townships and new, increasingly 
defensive, middle income housing estates.
The questions that now confront the city are whether it can shift 
off this path and meet the challenge of re-integrating all race and 
class groups across the spatial divide between core and periphery.
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APPENDIX 1
AFRICAN POPULATION ESTIMATES BY SETTLEMENT 
TYPE AND SUB REGION: DURBAN FUNCTIONAL 
REGION 1980-1987

















































Grand Total 1 178 050 1 566 100 1 933 900
Source: M ay and Stavrou, 1989: 19; 47-8
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APPENDIX 2
TOTAL DEATHS RESULTING FROM POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN 
THE DURBAN FUNCTIONAL REGION, 1986-1992
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
SOUTH
Formal 8 10 9 12 71 45 108
Informal 34 18 10 16 163 142 383
TOTAL 42 28 19 28 234 187 491
Proportion of total 29% 20% 5% 5% 29% 42% 60%
NORTH
Formal 45 17 13 86 79 67 67
Informal 0 7 21 129 201 61 79
TOTAL 45 24 34 215 280 128 146
Proportion of total 31% 17% 9% 42% 35% 29% 18%
WEST
Formal 12 55 153 105 112 23 36
Informal 7 26 157 143 148 87 99
TOTAL 19 81 310 248 260 110 135
Proportion of total 13% 58% 82% 48% 32% 25% 17%
CENTRAL
Formal 35 6 11 24 27 16 35
Informal 2 0 0 0 3 0 5
TOTAL 37 6 11 24 30 16 40
Proportion of total 26% 4% 3% 5% 4% 4% 5%
TOTAL 100 88 186 227 289 151 246
Proportion of total 70% 63% 50% 44% 36% 34% 30%
TOTAL 43 51 188 288 515 290 566
Proportion of total 30% 37% 50% 56% 64% 66% 70%
GRAND TOTAL 143 139 374 515 804 441 812
Source: A Louw, Project on Violence Statistics, Centre fo r  Social and Development 
Studies, University o f Natal.
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NOTES
1 The questions addressed in this paper flow from an earlier paper in which 
we asked why "... in a society where whites historically have dominated 
and oppressed blacks, often violently, black people are killing each other 
rather than whites" (Morris and Hindson, 1992a). Our concern here is to 
examine more closely the question of internecine violence in the 1980s and 
how it arose out of the racial geography of the apartheid city.
2 The little housing that was constructed comprised mainly privately built 
homes catering for an emerging African middle income group within the 
townships.
3 This process of densification also included 'doubling up' in hostels and 
domestic quarters.
4 Estimates of the informally housed population on the periphery over the 
period are: 38 000 in 1965; 150 000 in 1969; and 275 000 by 1973 
(Maasdorp and Humphries, 1975).
5 Although some examples of squatting within the inner city were evident in 
the early to mid-1980s, it is in the late 1980s and 1990s that this has 
become increasingly open rather than clandestine.
6 Summary report on class formation and residential mobility in the Durban 
Functional Region, (Hindson and Byerley, 1993, forthcoming), Institute for 
Social and Economic Research, University of Durban-Westville, Durban.
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